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EXTENDING TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OUTSIDE
OF INDIAN COUNTRY: KELSEY V. POPE
Greg S. Keogh*
I. Introduction
The inherent sovereignty of American Indian tribes, such as the Little
River Band of Ottawa Indians, was recognized long before the founding of
the United States. In fact, Indian tribal governments are some of the earliest
governments in the world.1 However, the powers and authorities
intertwined with inherent sovereignty are neither established nor protected
by the United States Constitution.2 Although the structure and
responsibilities of tribal governments varied from tribe to tribe, most tribes
used some form of authoritative body to facilitate societal control.3 These
governing bodies held tribal members to a certain standard of individual
behavior and self-control within the society. Members that did not live up
to these standards and tribal norms were punished. Depending on the extent
of the deviation, punishments included, but were not limited to, ordering the
violator to make a payment to the injured member, banishing the violator,
and, in extreme cases, sentencing the violator to death.4 In short, Indian
tribes have possessed and exercised the power to maintain social order over
their members for well over two hundred years.5
This Note will explore the inherent sovereign powers retained by Indian
tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members. In particular,
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Tribal Sovereignty: History and the Law, NATIVE AM. CAUCUS OF THE CAL.
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, http://www.nativeamericancaucus.org/resources/tribal-sovereigntyhistory-and-the-law (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
2. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788
F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 168
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
3. See, e.g., RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN
TO COURT (1975).
4. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01(1)(a), at 206 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., Supp. 2017) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (citing RAYMOND D.
AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELFGOVERNANCE (2009); SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994);
KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); D’ARCY
MCNICKLE, THEY CAME HERE FIRST 52-65 (Harper & Row, rev. ed. 1975) (1949)).
5. Tribal Sovereignty: History and the Law, supra note 1.
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this Note will analyze and compare the competing theories of membershipbased jurisdiction and territory-based jurisdiction, as well as the extent to
which Congress or treaties have limited jurisdictional powers. Furthermore,
this Note will discuss the significance of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Kelsey v. Pope.6
II. The Contours of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
Although Indian tribes no longer possess the same freedom to prescribe
laws for their members and punishments for violators, they do retain unique
and limited powers of sovereignty. The United States has long recognized
Indian tribes as “separate people[s], with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations . . . .”7 These powers are not granted from the
United States to Indian tribes, but are inherent powers tribes have retained
since long before the arrival of any European nation.8 However, tribes’
“incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance
of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the
sovereignty which they had previously exercised.”9 This dependent
relationship meant that tribal sovereignty, in a practical sense, hinged upon
recognition by the United States government and could be limited by
treaties and congressional enactments.
One such impediment on tribal sovereignty includes Congress’s ability
to wield their “plenary and exclusive” power to limit tribal authority. 10 By
creating laws and limiting tribal powers, the United States has exerted
control over Indian Country11 and all members within its boundaries. While
a tribe’s presence within the territorial boundaries of the United States
divests it of certain powers of sovereignty, including the power to enter into
treaties with foreign nations, there are few limitations on internal tribal
sovereignty.12 Therefore, Indian tribes retain all sovereign powers to selfgovern and facilitate social control, so long as those powers have not been

6. 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Kelsey v. Bailey, 137 S. Ct. 183
(2016).
7. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
8. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
9. Id. at 323.
10. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (citing United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004)).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (“[A]ll land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . .”).
12. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 4.02(1), at 222.
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expressly limited by statute, treaty, or implicit divestment by virtue of the
tribe’s domestic dependent status.13
An inherent sovereign power retained by tribes is the authority to
exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over certain minor crimes
committed by an Indian in Indian Country.14 Over the years, Congress has
enacted several provisions of the federal criminal code to limit tribes’
inherent sovereign power to exercise tribal criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country. The General Crimes Act (GCA)15 and the Major Crimes Act
(MCA)16 are two of the most significant additions to the federal criminal
code.
The GCA provides that “the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall extend to the Indian
country,” but not if the offense is “committed by one Indian against . . .
another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country.”17 These “general laws” are “criminal statutes enacted by Congress
to govern admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” and to protect important
federal properties, including “post offices, national parks, and military
installations.”18
The MCA dictates that a tribal member who commits any felony listed in
the statute against any person within Indian Country shall be subject to the
exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the federal government.19 Unlike the
GCA, the MCA applies even if both the defendant and the victim are tribal
members.20 Therefore, minor offenses committed by one tribal member
against another within Indian Country remain within a tribal government’s
exclusive criminal jurisdiction.
Until recently, it was widely assumed that any offense committed by one
tribal member against another outside of Indian Country, regardless of
severity, fell under the criminal jurisdiction of either the state or federal
government. For example, in Roe v. Doe,21 Jane Roe, a member of the
13. Id. at 223.
14. Id. § 9.04, at 765-69.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
18. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 9.02(1)(c)(i), at 740 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 7
(2012)).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
20. Id.
21. 649 N.W.2d 566 (N.D. 2002).
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Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, brought suit against John Doe, a member of the
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, in an attempt to
establish that Doe was the father of Roe’s child.22 After the trial court ruled
against Doe, he moved to vacate the judgment for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Doe asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because both Roe and Doe were tribal members, and both
parties and the child were legal residents within Indian Country at the time
of the suit.23 After the trial court denied his motion, Doe appealed to the
Supreme Court of North Dakota. Examining the circumstances in which the
United States Supreme Court has upheld tribal courts’ exclusive civil
jurisdiction, the court found that pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act,
tribal courts possess “exclusive jurisdiction ‘over any child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the
reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested
in the State by existing Federal law.’”24 Thereafter, the court noted that
although this case concerned tribal civil jurisdiction, “an Indian tribe has
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against
Indians in Indian country unless such crimes fall within the Major Crimes
Act . . . . However, outside of Indian country, the state has general criminal
jurisdiction over all persons, including Indians.”25 After finding “the record
indicate[d] that all the events leading up to the action occurred off [the
reservation],” the court reaffirmed the notion that, “[a]bsent express federal
law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have
generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise
applicable to all citizens of the State.”26 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota affirmed the trial court’s denial of Doe’s motion to vacate the
trial court’s judgment.27
In Kelsey v. Pope, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit took a different stance by endorsing the notion that Indian
tribes have retained the inherent sovereign authority to exercise
membership-based criminal jurisdiction independent of territorial

22. Id. at 567-68.
23. Id. at 567-68.
24. Id. at 569 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)).
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. at 579-80 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at 580.
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jurisdiction, even when the parties are members of different tribes.28 The
Sixth Circuit’s holding is an important stepping-stone towards greater
freedom and lesser restraint on Indian tribes’ ability to exercise their
inherent sovereign powers, as it is the first federal judicial decision to
recognize a tribe’s power to extend criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian
Country.
III. Background of Kelsey v. Pope
The historical background of Kelsey v. Pope helps address why the Sixth
Circuit held that Indian tribes may have retained the inherent sovereign
power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members for conduct
occurring outside of Indian Country under certain limited conditions.
Located in northwest Michigan, the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians
(the “Band”) “is a federally recognized Indian tribe presently maintaining a
government-to-government relationship with the United States.”29 Although
this relationship and recognition has fluctuated over the years, the Band
“became the first tribe ‘acknowledged’ by the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to the federal acknowledgment process . . . .”30 Due to this
recognition and incorporation within the territorial boundaries of the United
States, the Band was divested of several aspects of the inherent sovereign
powers it once possessed.31
Importantly, however, the Band retains “the inherent authority to
establish [its] own form of government, including tribal justice systems.” 32
Exerting these retained sovereign powers, the Band enacted a tribal
constitution and established judicial independence.33 Under this constitution
and the powers vested within, the Band’s tribal courts have the power “[t]o
adjudicate all civil and criminal matters arising within the jurisdiction of the
Tribe or to which the Tribe or an enrolled member of the Tribe is a party.”34
However, the issue of whether the Band retained the authority to extend
criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian Country—under a membership-based

28. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 860 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676, 686 (1990)).
29. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Office of U.S. Attorney for
W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 961 (6th Cir. 2004).
30. Id. at 962; see 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.20-83.46.
31. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4).
33. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS CONST. art. VI, § 9.
34. Id. art. VI, § 8.
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jurisdictional approach rather than a territory-based jurisdictional
approach—remained unanswered until recently.
IV. Kelsey v. Pope
Norbert Kelsey, an elected member of the Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians’ nine-person tribal council, was charged with misdemeanor sexual
assault and harassment in the Little River Tribal Court for inappropriate
actions toward Heidi Foster.35 “Foster [was] an employee of the Band’s
medical clinic and a member of a neighboring tribe.”36 The incident
occurred on July 5, 2005, during a meeting of the tribal elders at the Band’s
Community Center, located outside of Indian Country.37 Almost three years
later, the tribal court held that “[s]ince Defendant [was] a tribal member, his
victim [was] a Native American, and the site of his crime was a facility
owned by the Tribe, [the] case was clearly within the territorial and subject
matter jurisdiction of [the] court.”38 The Little River Tribal Court convicted
Kelsey and sentenced him to six months in jail.39
Kelsey appealed the tribal court’s judgment to the Little River Court of
Appeals, arguing the Band lacked the authority to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over his conduct because the incident occurred outside of the
Band’s territory.40 Kelsey also asserted that section 4.03 of the Band’s
Criminal Offenses Ordinance precludes criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members for conduct outside of Indian Country.41 Under section 4.03(a),
criminal jurisdiction extends to “[1] all land within the limits of the Tribe's
reservation . . . [,] [2] [land] held in trust by the United States . . . [,] and [3]
land considered ‘Indian country.’”42 Moreover, section 4.03(b) grants tribal
courts the authority to extend criminal jurisdiction over members, no matter
where the offense was committed, if the member committed any one of

35. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. Kelsey, No. 07103TM, 2008 WL 6928233,
at *1 (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Ct. Aug. 21, 2008). Kelsey was charged
under LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-400-03, § 4.03(b) (2010).
36. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2016).
37. Id.
38. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, No. 07103TM, at *2.
39. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 853.
40. Id. at 852.
41. Id. at 853.
42. Id. at 864 (quoting LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-400-03,
§ 4.03(a) (2010)).
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nine enumerated offenses.43 Sexual assault is not among these offenses.44
Although Kelsey’s conduct did not fall within any of the provisions of
section 4.03, the tribal court of appeals found this section inconsistent with
the authority granted in the Band’s constitution45 and section 8.08 of the
Criminal Procedure Ordinance.46 Section 4.03 was deemed
“‘unconstitutionally narrow in that it [did] not provide for the exercise of
inherent criminal jurisdiction over all tribal lands.’”47 Thus, the tribal court
of appeals removed the incongruous territorial limitation and affirmed the
jurisdictional reach of the Band.48
Kelsey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District
of Michigan, arguing that (1) the Band lacked inherent sovereign authority
to extend criminal jurisdiction over his off-reservation conduct, and (2) the
retroactive application of the criminal laws by the tribal court of appeals
violated his due process protections under the Indian Civil Rights Act.49 A
magistrate judge examined Kelsey’s appeal and found that “the Tribe
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Kelsey because the alleged crime occurred
outside Indian country,” as well as “that the Tribe's attempt to retroactively
expand its jurisdiction to encompass crimes that occurred outside Indian
country, if effective, would have violated Kelsey's due process rights.”50
The district court, while agreeing with the magistrate judge’s conclusion
that the Band lacked the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
Kelsey because the incident occurred outside of Indian Country, refused to

43. Id. (citing LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, Ordinance 03-400-03, § 4.03(b)
(2010)).
44. Id.
45. “The Tribe's jurisdiction over its members and territory shall be exercised to the
fullest extent consistent with this Constitution, the sovereign powers of the Tribe, and federal
law.” LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).
46. “The Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction over any action by any Indian as defined
by this Ordinance, that is made a criminal offense under applicable Tribal Code and that
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe . . . .” LITTLE RIVER BAND OF
OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-300-03, § 8.08 (2003), quoted in Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 865.
This provision was reworded in 2011. See LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS,
ORDINANCE 03-300-03, § 8.08 (2011), http://lrboi-nsn.gov/images/docs/council/
docs/ordinances/Title%20300-03.pdf.
47. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 865 (quoting Transcript of Record at 9, Little River Band of
Ottawa Indians v. Kelsey, 8 Am. Tribal Law 283 (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal
Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2009)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 854; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012).
50. Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09-CV-1015, 2014 WL 1338170, at *1 (W.D. Mich. 2014).
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address the due process issue.51 “Accordingly, the district court granted
habeas relief for lack of tribal jurisdiction.”52 The Band then appealed the
district court’s judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
The issues brought before the Sixth Circuit were: (1) whether the Band
lacked criminal jurisdiction over Kelsey’s off-reservation conduct, and (2)
whether the judgment by the tribal court of appeals violated Kelsey’s due
process protections established under the Indian Civil Rights Act.53
However, to answer these issues, the Sixth Circuit first had to address the
broader issue of whether a tribal court’s criminal jurisdiction is territorybased or membership-based.
V. Decision of the Case
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
Western District Court of Michigan’s finding that tribal criminal
jurisdiction was lacking and vacated the lower court’s grant of habeas
corpus relief.54 The Sixth Circuit held that the Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians properly asserted criminal jurisdiction over Kelsey, even though his
conduct occurred outside of Indian Country.55 To reach this decision, the
Court broke down the governing framework into three separate inquiries:
“(1) [D]o Indian tribes have inherent sovereign authority to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction? (2) If so, has that authority been expressly
limited by Congress or treaty? And (3) if not, have the tribes been implicitly
divested of that authority by virtue of their domestic dependent status?”56
A. “Do Indian Tribes Have Inherent Sovereign Authority to Exercise ExtraTerritorial Criminal Jurisdiction?”
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the Tribe’s inherent sovereign authority
as it relates to extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction. As discussed above, the
ability to prescribe laws for tribal members and to punish violators who
break said laws is an inherent sovereign power retained by Indian tribes.57
51. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 854.
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8).
54. Id. at 852.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 855.
57. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
381-82 (1886).
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However, the issue involved in Kelsey was not simply whether a tribe may
exert criminal jurisdiction over a member, but whether this inherent
authority extends outside of Indian Country.58 Kelsey argued that the power
to exercise criminal jurisdiction is governed by “the twin factors of tribal
membership and territory . . . .”59 When either factor is missing from the
equation, the Tribe’s authority is nearly, if not completely, non-existent.60
Arguing against this notion, the Band contended that tribes maintain the
“‘inherent authority to prosecute tribal members for offenses substantially
affecting tribal self-governance interests,’ even when such offenses take
place outside of Indian country.”61 In order to decide the more persuasive
argument, the Sixth Circuit examined Supreme Court62 and Ninth Circuit
precedent.63 Agreeing with the Band, the court found that “[t]he two most
helpful cases in establishing membership as the driving force behind
criminal jurisdiction are Wheeler . . . and Duro . . . .”64
In United States v. Wheeler, a Navajo tribal member convicted in tribal
court for contributing to the delinquency of a minor was subsequently
indicted in federal court for statutory rape.65 In that case, the Supreme Court
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution66 does not bar federal prosecution of a criminal who has
already been punished in a tribal court.67 The Court reasoned that the grand
jury’s indictment did not constitute double jeopardy because “the power to
punish offenses against tribal law committed by [tribal] members, which
was part of the Navajos' primeval sovereignty, has never been taken away
from them, either explicitly or implicitly, and is attributable in no way to
any delegation to them of federal authority.”68 Thus, when a tribe exercises
58. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 854-55.
59. Id. at 856.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 855-56.
62. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); South Dakota v. Bourland,
508 U.S. 679 (1993); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978).
63. See Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991);
Sidney v. Zah, 718 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1983); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1974).
64. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 856 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, and Duro, 495 U.S. 676).
65. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
67. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332.
68. Id. at 328.
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criminal jurisdiction over a tribal member, “it does so as part of its retained
sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Government.”69 Although the
conduct at issue occurred within Indian Country, Wheeler marked the first
time the Supreme Court differentiated between member and nonmember
Indians—stating that tribes retain “attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory . . . .”70
“While Wheeler provides a legal basis for the uncontroversial belief that
tribes did not historically tip-toe around territorial borders in asserting their
authority to enforce tribal laws,”71 the court found that “Duro offers the
most direct support for membership-based jurisdiction.”72 The Duro case
involved a member of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission
Indians who “allegedly shot and killed a 14-year-old boy within the Salt
River [Pima-Maricopa Indian Community’s] Reservation boundaries.”73 In
this critical decision, the Supreme Court held that an Indian tribe lacked the
authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of other tribes
regardless of whether the conduct occurred within its own territory.74
In response to this decision, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights
Act to indicate that the retained powers of Indian tribes include “the
inherent power . . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”75
Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the
Tribe possessed the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, the Court affirmed the notion that tribes do possess the power
to prosecute members.76 The Court stated that “[r]etained criminal
jurisdiction over members is accepted by our precedents and justified by the
voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of
participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on
consent.”77
In Kelsey, Judge McKeague noted that it is “[t]his consensual agreement
between a tribe and its members [that] provides the core principle
underpinning and justifying a membership-based jurisdiction that is not

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 856 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. (citation omitted).
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 679, 679 (1990).
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
Duro, 495 U.S. at 694.
Id.
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rigidly tied to geographic qualifications.”78 Although neither Wheeler nor
Duro expressly declared that tribes retain the inherent sovereign authority
to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over tribal members, the court found
that “their core principles strongly support the Band’s theory of
jurisdiction.”79 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit answered the first of the three
separate inquiries in the affirmative—Indian tribes have inherent sovereign
authority to exercise extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction.80
B. Since Tribes Have Inherent Sovereign Authority to Exercise ExtraTerritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, Has That Authority Been “Expressly
Limited by Congress or Treaty”?
Addressing the second inquiry—whether Congress or treaties have
expressly limited this inherent sovereign authority to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction—the court found that neither Kelsey nor the
Western District of Michigan “identified any treaty or statute that explicitly
divests the Band of extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction.”81 Therefore, the
second inquiry was answered in the negative; neither congressional action
nor treaty has limited the Band’s inherent sovereign authority.82
C. Have Tribes Been Implicitly Divested of the Power to Exercise
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by “Virtue of Their Domestic Dependent
Status”?
Turning to its third inquiry—whether Indian tribes’ status as domestic
dependents implicitly divests them of the inherent sovereign authority to
exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction—the court examined (1) “the history
and breadth of implicit divestiture”83 and (2) “whether statutes extending
federal jurisdiction into Indian country serve as a basis for implicitly
divesting tribes of their jurisdiction over off-reservation offenses.”84
Implicit divestiture is a judicially crafted theory that imposes additional
limitations on tribal authority and “prohibits tribes from exercising various

78. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 856 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Kelsey v.
Bailey, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016).
79. Id. at 859.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 860.
84. Id.
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types of civil legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction.”85 The Supreme
Court created this theory in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,86 a case
involving two non-Indians arrested and charged in tribal court for separate
incidents occurring within the territory of the Suquamish Indians. “Oliphant
thoroughly canvassed the history of treaties, statutes, and judicial decisions
regarding crimes in Indian country and found a ‘commonly shared
presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts
that tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians.’”87
Although Congress never explicitly divested Indian tribes of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian individuals for conduct within Indian Country,
the Supreme Court found “that Congress consistently believed this to be the
necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.”88 Weighing in on the
subject, Judge McKeague stated that this belief was founded on Indian
“tribes’ dependent status, identifying what [the Supreme Court] perceived
to be an incongruous result should ‘Indian Tribes, although fully
subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States, retain the power to try
non-Indians according to [tribal] customs and procedure.’”89 The Supreme
Court has consistently affirmed and extended this rationale in the years
since Oliphant.90 However, the Court has also expressly stated that Indian
tribes have not been divested of the inherent sovereign power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over members for conduct that occurred within their
territories.91
Despite the Kelsey court finding that tribes have not been implicitly
divested of the inherent sovereign power to charge and prosecute their
members for on-reservation conduct, it found tribes’ “unique dependent
status requires a more nuanced analysis in determining whether they may
extend tribal prosecutions to members’ off-reservation conduct.”92 In
undergoing this “nuanced analysis,” the court examined Montana v. United
85. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.02(3)(a), at 226 (citing Sarah Krakoff,
Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 COLO. L. REV.
1187 (2010)).
86. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
87. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 860 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206).
88. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
89. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 860 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208-11).
90. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981).
91. See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 686; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197,
205 (2004).
92. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 860 (emphasis added).
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States,93 which asked whether the Crow Tribe possessed the inherent power
to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by non-Indian
individuals on lands not owned by the Tribe but within its reservation
boundaries.94 In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court “clarified [that] the
extent of sovereign authority [was] implicitly divested as a result of the
tribes’ dependent status.”95 The Montana Court declared that the “exercise
of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation.”96 Accordingly, when examining if the Band’s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction complied with Montana, the Kelsey court found it
was “important to determine exactly what the Band [was] and [was] not
arguing with respect to the scope of their jurisdictional power”97 in order to
determine whether their asserted extra-territorial authority dealt with
internal relations and self-governance.
VI. Application and Ruling
The Kelsey court found that the Band was aware “that a free-floating,
membership-based jurisdiction over any criminal conduct”98 has the
potential to conflict with Montana’s prescription that tribes’ limit criminal
jurisdiction to “only that which is ‘necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or control internal relations.’”99 Accordingly, the Band argued
that Indian tribes possess a narrow, inherent extra-territorial power to
exercise criminal jurisdiction for conduct occurring outside of Indian
Country, “at least where the offenses substantially affect [a tribe’s] selfgovernance interests.”100
Agreeing with the Band, the court found that Kelsey’s conduct involved
essential tribal government concerns and therefore substantially affected the
Band’s “ability to control its self-governance.”101 Examining the specific
conduct at issue, the court found the following: Kelsey was a board member
of the Band’s legislative Tribal Council; Foster, Kelsey’s victim and
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 550-51.
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 861 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. 544).
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 861.
Id.
Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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member of a neighboring tribe, was an employee of the Little River Band of
Ottawa Indians and was acting within the scope of her employment at an
official meeting of the Tribal Council; and the incident “took place at the
[Band’s] Community Center, the center of Tribal community activities ever
since it was purchased.”102 The court held that “[t]his [was] no run-of-themill criminal conduct, but conduct visited on the Band's employee by the
Band's own elected official during an official tribal function: in pure form,
this was an offense against the peace and dignity of the Band itself.”103
While a broad scope of membership-based jurisdiction over any criminal
conduct is certainly unharmonious with tribes’ status as dependent
sovereigns, the court held that “the instant exercise of criminal jurisdiction
[did] not fall within that category.”104
Next, the court examined whether statutes extending federal jurisdiction
into Indian Country should serve as a basis for implicitly divesting the Band
of its jurisdiction over off-reservation offenses.105 Kelsey argued that
several federal statutes, including the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
(“Non-Intercourse Act”),106 the Indian Country Crimes Act (“ICCA”),107
and the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”),108 suggest Congress believes “that
tribes have been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction outside their
territory.”109
The Non-Intercourse Act was “[t]he first act of Congress that specifically
defined substantive rights and duties in the field of Indian affairs.”110 The
Act established, inter alia, federal regulation of trade with American
Indians and “federal jurisdiction to enforce state criminal laws against nonIndians who committed offenses against Indians in Indian country.”111
Additionally, the ICCA declared that federal criminal jurisdiction to punish
individuals for offenses shall extend into Indian Country except where the
offense is “committed by one Indian against the person or property of
another Indian.”112 The MCA further extended federal criminal jurisdiction
over Indians by declaring that any Indian who commits any felony listed in
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
Id.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 1.03(2), at 35.
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 862.
18 U.S.C. § 1152.
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the statute, such as murder or kidnapping, against any person within Indian
Country, shall be under the federal government’s exclusive criminal
jurisdiction.113 The court found, however, that these statutes failed to
address “a tribe’s authority over member conduct outside the
reservation.”114
While the district court declared that Congress believes tribes have been
implicitly divested of their jurisdiction over off-reservation offenses due to
lack of statutes discussing this type of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, the
Kelsey court disagreed.115 The Sixth Circuit found that this “legislative
void” does not demonstrate “[c]ongressional intent to limit tribal criminal
jurisdiction to Indian country” for three reasons.116 First, the court began by
considering the findings in United States v. Wheeler.117 In this case, the
Supreme Court examined the Non-Intercourse Act and the ICCA and found
the two statutes “to be examples of general limitations on tribal criminal
jurisdiction that do not limit tribal authority over members.” 118 The Kelsey
court upheld and followed this finding.119 In fact, in discussing the two
statutes, the Court in Wheeler expressly stated that “far from depriving
Indian tribes of their sovereign power to punish offenses against tribal law
by members of a tribe, Congress has repeatedly recognized that power and
declined to disturb it.”120
Second, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court incorrectly found
that the lack of statutes addressing concurrent criminal jurisdiction for
conduct occurring outside of Indian Country demonstrates congressional
intent to limit tribal criminal jurisdiction to Indian Country. The Sixth
Circuit found that this approach conflicts with the holdings of Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante121 and Helvering v. Hallock.122 In LaPlante, an
insurance company brought suit in federal court against members of the
Blackfeet Indian Tribe seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or
indemnify its insured after an employee of the insured sought compensation
from involvement in a motor vehicle accident.123 The Supreme Court held
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

18 U.S.C. § 1153.
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 862.
Id.
Id.
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 862.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 (1978)).
480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
309 U.S. 106, 132-33 (1940).
LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 11-12.
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that because Indian tribes retain “all inherent attributes of sovereignty that
have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference
from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact.”124 In
Helvering, the Supreme Court examined “whether transfers of property
inter vivos made in trust . . . [were] within the provisions of [section] 302(c)
of the Revenue Act of 1926.”125 Here, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
notion that congressional silence meant inherent sovereign authority
remained.126
Third, the court held that congressional silence on whether tribal criminal
jurisdiction could possibly extend outside of Indian Country must not be
viewed as an implicit divestiture of tribes’ inherent sovereign powers.127
Although the district court stated that “[i]t is inconceivable that Congress
overlooked such an anomaly, regulating tribal jurisdiction [in] Indian
country closely for these past two centuries, while leaving the tribes free to
assert criminal jurisdiction outside Indian Country,”128 the Sixth Circuit
disagreed. Citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, in which the
Supreme Court examined “whether tribal sovereign immunity bars [the
State of] Michigan's suit against the Bay Mills Indian Community for
opening a casino outside Indian lands,”129 the court here found that it should
not assume that Congress sought to undermine tribal self-governance.130
Rather, Congress created criminal jurisdiction within Indian Country to
bestow “criminal justice where tribal powers were presumed absent or
inadequate.”131 Accordingly, “[g]iven the baseline assumption that, ‘until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority,’”132 the
court held that courts must respect Congress’s function of elucidating the
retained sovereign powers of Indian tribes.133 Additionally, in the absence

124. Id. at 18 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982)).
125. Helvering, 309 U.S. at 109.
126. Id. at 121 (“[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of
corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.”).
127. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 863 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Kelsey v.
Bailey, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016).
128. Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09–CV–1015, 2014 WL 1338170, at *20 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
31, 2014), rev'd and vacated, 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016).
129. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2028 (2014).
130. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 863.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2026).
133. Id.
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of a legislative framework, tribes retain all inherent sovereign powers not
divested.134
For the reasons explained above, the court held that since Kelsey’s
conduct involved essential tribal government concerns substantially
affecting the Band’s “ability to control its self-governance,”135 the Band
continues to possess the inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over Kelsey’s conduct, despite it occurring outside of Indian
Country. Therefore, the court “reverse[d] the district court’s grant of habeas
relief for lack of tribal jurisdiction.”136
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit examined whether the tribal court of appeals
judgment violated Kelsey’s due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights
Act (ICRA).137 Because “[t]he Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes,”138 the court
found that ICRA was the only source of due process relief for Kelsey.139
ICRA provides that no Indian tribe may “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty
or property without due process of law.”140 Kelsey’s conduct involved
essential tribal government concerns that substantially affected the Band’s
self-governance. Conclusively, it was within tribal jurisdiction, and thus the
court found that Kelsey was protected.141
Kelsey argued that his due process protections were violated when the
tribal court of appeals “[struck] down a territorial limitation on the Band's
jurisdiction in one of the Tribal criminal ordinances and ‘retroactively
expand[ed] the geographic reach’ of criminal jurisdiction over his offreservation conduct.”142 At the time of the incident, section 4.03(a) of the
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ Criminal Offenses Ordinance
provided that criminal jurisdiction shall extend to “[1] all land within the
limits of the Tribe's reservation . . . [,] [2] [land] held in trust by the United
States . . . [,] and [3] land considered ‘Indian country.’”143 Section 4.03(b)
provided that criminal jurisdiction could be exercised over a tribal member
134. Id.
135. Id. at 861.
136. Id. at 863.
137. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012).
138. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 863.
139. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8).
140. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8).
141. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 864.
142. Id. (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964)).
143. Id. (quoting LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-400-03, §
4.03(a) (2010)).
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if he or she committed any one of nine enumerated offenses, no matter
where the conduct occurred.144 “Sexual assault was not one of the
enumerated offenses.”145 Consequently, Kelsey claimed that the tribal
courts lacked criminal jurisdiction to charge and convict him.146 However,
the tribal court of appeals found—and the Sixth Circuit agreed—that the
Offenses Ordinance conflicted with both the Band’s constitution and
section 8.08 of the Band’s Criminal Procedure Ordinance.147
The tribal court of appeals held that the Offenses Ordinance, which
Kelsey relied upon, was unconstitutional.148 Article I of the Band’s
constitution provides that “[t]he territory of the Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians shall encompass all lands which are now or hereinafter owned by or
reserved for the Tribe”149 and that “[t]he Tribe’s jurisdiction over its
members and territory shall be exercised to the fullest extent consistent with
this Constitution, the sovereign powers of the Tribe, and federal law.”150
Thus, Article I of the Band’s constitution “required extending jurisdiction
over tribal members and also to tribally-owned land (like the Community
Center) ‘to the fullest extent’ permissible under tribal and federal law.”151
Further, section 8.08 of the Band’s Criminal Procedure Ordinance declares
that “[t]he Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction over any action by any
Indian as defined by this ordinance, that is made a criminal offense under
[the] applicable Tribal Code and that occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Tribe as defined in the Constitution.”152 The Sixth Circuit
held that, rather than retroactively expanding the geographic reach of
criminal jurisdiction as Kelsey alleged, the tribal court of appeals removed
the “dissonant territorial limitation” in order “[t]o harmonize the Offenses
Ordinance with the Tribal Constitution.”153 Therefore, since both the
Band’s constitution and section 8.08 of the Band’s Criminal Procedure
Ordinance “provided warning that criminal jurisdiction would extend to
Kelsey's conduct by virtue of either Tribal ownership of the Community
144. Id. (quoting LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-400-03, §
4.03(b) (2010)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 864-65.
148. Id. at 865.
149. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF INDIANS OF OTTAWA CONST. art. I, § 1.
150. Id. art. I, § 2.
151. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 865.
152. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-300-03, § 8.08 (2003),
quoted in Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 865.
153. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 865.
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Center or Kelsey's tribal membership,” the Sixth Circuit held that Kelsey
was not denied fair notice.154
VII. The Significance of the Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit’s holding is an emphatic victory for Indian tribes
because it is the first federal judicial decision to recognize a tribe’s power
to extend criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian Country. The District Court
for the Western District of Michigan inferred that the lack of federal
statutes addressing concurrent criminal jurisdiction for conduct occurring
outside of Indian Country demonstrated congressional intent to implicitly
divest tribes of their power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over offreservation offenses. In stark contrast, the Sixth Circuit found that unless
Congress has expressly divested tribes of such powers, they are maintained.
Not only did the Sixth Circuit endorse the inherent sovereign authority of
tribes, but the court’s holding affirmed that Indian tribes have the power to
enforce membership-based criminal jurisdiction, independent of the already
established territorial-based jurisdiction. However, it is important to note
that the Sixth Circuit’s holding does not grant tribes the power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over tribal members for any conduct occurring outside
of Indian Country. Rather, the court recognized that a “free-floating,
membership-based jurisdiction” over any criminal conduct has the potential
to create significant problems with Montana’s holding. Using the Montana
rule to determine whether a tribe has overstepped their jurisdictional
authority, the court correctly established a narrow precedent that must be
read in light of the unique facts. Under this rule from the Sixth Circuit, in
order for a tribe to enforce its criminal jurisdictional authority over conduct
occurring off-reservation, the exercise of such power must be necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.
Here, the interests of the Band to protect the tribe’s self-governance and
to control internal relations were overwhelmingly obvious. This case
involved one of nine elected officials of the Band’s Tribal Council, Kelsey,
who was acting as an agent of the Tribe when the incident occurred. Foster,
the other actor, was a tribal employee. Although the incident occurred
outside of Indian Country, both Kelsey and Foster were attending a tribal
activity at a tribally-owned community center. Further, the Sixth Circuit
noted that “[i]t also involve[d] a Tribal Court finding that [Kelsey]
exercised political influence affecting the victim and the Tribe's welfare.”155
154. Id. at 868.
155. Id. at 853 n.1.
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The United States Supreme Court’s denial of Kelsey’s petition for writ
of certiorari on October 3, 2016,156 solidifies the Sixth Circuit’s rule that
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign powers not expressly divested by
Congress. Accordingly, tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over
members for conduct occurring outside of Indian Country if it is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations. However,
many questions regarding the breadth of such powers remain unanswered.
One such example focuses on whether a tribe can exercise criminal
jurisdiction over a tribal member for illegal conduct occurring outside of
Indian Country and on property not owned by the tribe. Regardless of the
answers to these lingering questions, the Sixth Circuit’s holding remains a
momentous triumph for Indian tribes.

156. See Kelsey v. Bailey, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016).
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